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Abstract 
The strategy by which a platform owner manages the future trajectory of its platform 
involves many unknowns. In particular, the ambition to simultaneously control the 
platform and distribute design capability to users is challenging. While there is an 
emerging literature on strategy in platform ecosystems, little empirical evidence exists 
about the series of strategic actions that platform owners conduct to create value in an 
ecosystem context. Drawing on a strategy-as-process perspective, this paper augments 
existing platform perspectives by seeking to understand the micro-strategizing of a 
platform owner. To this end, we report a multiple case study of Apple’s use of 
application programming interfaces for generating value from the iPhone platform. 
Our comparative analysis identifies and explores five different micro-strategies that can 
be enacted proactively or reactively: counteracting, monetizing, resourcing, securing, 
and sustaining. The paper concludes with a number of theoretical and practical 
implications of these micro-strategies and their interaction. 
Keywords:  Third-party development, platforms, ecosystems, boundary resources,  
micro-strategies, APIs. 
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Introduction 
In traditional strategy literature (see e.g., Porter 1980), the capability to strategically position a product 
relative to an industry’s competing forces has been considered vital. Such strategic positioning is typically 
based on the assumption of clear industry boundaries and players, waiting for being strategized through 
generic strategies such as cost leadership, product differentiation, or segmentation (Porter 1980). It has 
been noted that this strategy logic has a significantly weaker ability to explain strategic conduct in 
dynamic settings, where the competitive environment is turbulent and evolving with actors’ strategic 
moves (Sambamurthy et al. 2003). 
Contrasting this traditional strategic positioning logic, recent literature (Evans et al. 2006; Gawer and 
Cusumano 2008; Messerschmitt and Szyperski 2003; Tapscott and Williams 2006) notes that strategy in 
a platform context is about building double-sided markets where actors are collaborators as much as they 
are competitors. This shift in strategy practice diminishes the value of using industry as the basis for 
strategic analysis and suggests the need of a metaphor that captures the coopetition between platform 
stakeholders. As an example, consider the simultaneous collaboration and competition of third-party 
developers and platform owners. Third-party developers contribute ideas, solutions, and an 
understanding of users’ needs that platform owners might not possess (Tiwana et al. 2010). 
Simultaneously, such developers benefit from having a channel through which they can distribute their 
applications and services to a large user base (Ghazawneh 2011). Yet, this reciprocity is not static but is 
dynamic as the relationships between platform owner and application developers are renegotiated in 
action over time (Eaton et al. 2011; Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 2010).  The notion of ecosystem has 
taken the role of sensitizing this kind of mutual benefit and tension in current thinking about platform 
strategy (El Sawy et al. 2010; Tiwana et al. 2010; Yoo et al. 2010).  
Given that there exists a dissonance between traditional strategic models and the strategic reality of 
platform owners, there is a need of new knowledge about the role and nature of strategy in platform 
settings. To this end, recent literature has observed how platform boundary resources have emerged as an 
important means for enacting a platform strategy in practice (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 2010).   While 
a platform’s technical architecture and organizing principles influence its evolutionary trajectory and 
differentiation (Tiwana et al. 2010; Yoo et al. 2010), boundary resources such as APIs, SDKs, incentives, 
intellectual property rights, and agreements serve as tools for the strategizing around a platform. To date, 
however, little is known about platform owner’s use of platform boundary resources for implementing the 
seemingly minor strategic moves that make up its digital strategy. We refer to these elements of a strategy 
as micro-strategies. . 
The research question addressed in this paper is: What characterize the micro-strategies used by 
platform owners in attempts to create and sustain ecosystems through platform boundary resources? In 
order to address this research question, we designed a multiple case study (Gerring 2007; Yin 2009) and 
engaged in detailed empirical analysis of Apple’s resourcing their platform ecosystem. The contribution of 
this paper is the identification of a set of micro-strategies and a tentative understanding of how they play 
out in platform practice.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief overview of the 
literature on platforms, platform boundary resources, and ecosystems. Following the micro-strategizing 
perspective that serves as a theoretical basis for this paper, we present the methodology and the results of 
our multiple case study. The subsequent section identifies and explores five micro-strategies and their 
implications. The last section concludes the paper. 
Related Literature and Conceptual Basis 
Platforms and Platform Boundary Resources 
We define platforms as a set of interrelated specification layers that support interoperability between the 
technological modules of a system (Baldwin and Woodard 2009; Franke and von Hippel 2003; Gawer and 
Cusumano 2008; Morris and Ferguson 1993; West 2003) and provide a set of common resources from 
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which to generate derivative products and services (Robertson and Ulrich 1998). Among software 
platform owners, it has become increasingly common to nurture communities of third-party developers to 
build complementary assets to increase the value of the platform. Such assets (e.g., applications and 
services) promises to extend the software platform’s functionality, offer value to the platform’s users 
(Huang et al. 2009), and address heterogeneous end-user needs (Adomavicius et al. 2007; Evans et al. 
2006). Harnessing the collective power of third-party developers is enabled by providing specific platform 
boundary resources (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 2010) and granting access to complementary 
development (West 2003).  
Located at the interface between the platform owner and third-party developers, we define platform 
boundary resources as capabilities that facilitate the use of core functionality of a platform in application 
and service design. Examples of such capabilities are technical boundary resources like APIs and SDKs 
and social boundary resources like incentives, intellectual property rights, and agreements between the 
platform owner and third-party developers. Like any boundary object (Bergman et al. 2007; Carlile 2002; 
Star and Griesemer 1989), platform boundary resources are plastic enough to cut across multiple social 
worlds by providing enough structure to support several ecosystem parties in their development practices 
and ambitions (cf. Bergman et al. 2007; Star and Griesemer 1989). In addition, they can maintain a 
common identity across heterogeneous development settings while still being strongly structured in 
individual use (cf. Star and Griesemer 1989).  
The ability of platform boundary resources to activate the capabilities of a platform makes them 
important for in everyday platform strategizing (Yoo et al. 2010). They provide the means with which a 
platform owner can handle the delicate challenge to simultaneously maintain platform control and 
stimulate third-party development in platform ecosystems (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 2010). 
Shifting Strategic Focus: From Industry to Ecosystem 
Software platforms have taken a front-seat in shaping competitive dynamics in settings such as personal 
computers (Bresnahan and Greenstein 1999), video game consoles (Iansiti and Zhu 2007; Romberg 
2007), smartphones (Tiwana et al. 2010; Yoo et al. 2010; Ghazawneh 2011), web systems (Evans et al. 
2006; Ghazawneh, 2011), and automobiles (Henfridsson and Lindgren 2010). Recent research has 
therefore been occupied with developing a novel conceptual machinery that can help us understand this 
new strategic landscape (El Sawy et al. 2010; Tiwana et al. 2010; Yoo et al. 2010), The relevance of the 
traditional strategic emphasis on product positioning in pre-defined industries (cf. Porter 1980) 
dominated by scale and scope economics (Chandler 1990) is diminishing.   
To this end, the concept of ecosystem has been adopted as an alternative conception for describing the 
new arena for innovation.  Throughout this paper, we define an ecosystem as a functional unit consisting 
of a set of actors (e.g., platform owner, third-party developers, platform’s partners and users) and a set of 
technology elements (e.g., software platform, boundary resources) that are mutually interdependent. 
Centered on the platform and its market for applications and services, these relationships are operated 
through the exchange of information, resources and artifacts (Jansen et al. 2009). The increasing 
importance of software ecosystem has triggered researchers to focus on their design (e.g., Gawer and 
Cusumano 2002), economies and associated business and managerial strategies (see, e.g., Bresnahan and 
Greenstein 1999; Farrell et al.1998), level of openness and associated criticality (Gawer and Cusumano 
2002; Gawer and Henderson, 2007; Eisenmann et al. 2009; West 2003), governance (Ghazawneh and 
Henfridsson 2010), growth and appropriability (West, 2003) and even considered them as mediating 
markets (Caillaud and Jullien 2003; Parker and Van Alstyne 2005).  
One chief challenge for a platform owner is to stay in control of the ecosystem and simultaneously 
distribute design capability to third-party developers. The control that a platform owner exercises over the 
ecosystem and third-party developers is critically affecting the ecosystem growth and success (Parker and 
Van Alstyne 2008). The main motivation for third-party developers to join a platform ecosystem is to 
signal compatibility of software applications (Chellappa and Saraf 2010). In doing so, third-party 
developers gain access to the installed base of the platform ecosystem (Huang et al. 2009). The ecosystem 
is formed to facilitate such access that fills holes in the product lines of a platform (Baldwin and Clark 
2000; Evans et al. 2006). On the other hand, the nature of the ecosystem allows the platform owner to 
market applications and services that directly compete with ecosystem partners (Huang et al. 2009; Yoo 
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et al. 2010). For example, Apple is providing applications for their iPhone, iPad, and iPod Touch that 
compete directly with applications provided by third-party developers.  
Reviewing the literature, some of the research on platforms and platform ecosystem has indeed focused 
on the strategic implications of platform thinking. However, little empirical evidence exists about the 
specific process by which platform owners implement their strategies in the practice of ecosystems. To 
this end, we now present a micro-strategizing lens to better understand the dynamics of platform 
ecosystems. 
A Micro-Strategizing Perspective 
Strategy process research is usually distinguished from strategy content research with reference to its 
orientation towards how a particular firm’s strategy emerges, rather than what strategic decisions are 
taken and how they relate to the firm’s industrial context (Chia and MacKay 2007; Dess and Lumpkin 
2001; Bourgeois 1980).  The adoption of a strategy-as-process perspective (Chia and MacKay 2007; 
Johnson et al. 2003; Jarzabkowski 2008; Whittington 2006) provides a basis for understanding how the 
specifics of using platform boundary resources in a firm’s strategizing around ecosystems.  
The strategy-as-process perspective views the implementation of a strategy as a process of organizational 
becoming (Benson 1977; Orlikowski 2000; Tsoukas and Chia 2002). Similarly, we view the 
implementation of a platform strategy involving third-party development as process of ecosystem 
becoming. However, such strategizing is not so much about developing the contents of generic strategies 
such as cost-leadership, product differentiation, or segmentation (Porter 1980), as it is about dealing with 
the process of creating, sensing, and responding to emerging issues. In this regard, we view micro-
strategizing as a series of seemingly minor strategic moves made by a platform owner in response to 
actions taken by members of its ecosystem.  
Drawing on a strategy-as-process view (Johnson et al. 2003; Whittington 2006), this process can be 
understood by examining the interplay between three forces: strategy actors, strategic moves, and strategy 
practices. First, strategy actors refer to those who strategize in the ecosystem. Such actors exist on at least 
two levels. Strategy actors may be analyzed on a firm level, where specific firms may exercise control over 
the ecosystem through, e.g., their provision of valuable platform complements, or it might be firm 
representatives that shape strategy by exercising control over the embedding of strategy in administrative 
procedures such as allocation of resources (Jarzabkowski 2008). However, various actors accommodate 
the strategy in view of their current practice and enact their understanding of it to form new practices. 
Second, the contents of a strategy become material for sensemaking of strategy actors (Weick 1979). This 
sensemaking necessarily leads to new experiences, which, in turn, shapes the emergent praxis. Strategic 
moves are what strategy actors do, i.e., “all the various activities involved in the deliberate formulation 
and implementation of strategy” (Whittington 2006, p.619). Third, strategy practices are those rules and 
resources that strategy actors draw on in their praxis (Whittington 2006). Apart from the tacit practices 
that exist in any work setting, explicitly recognized practices exist both on the organization-specific level 
and on the extra-organizational level. Such practices can be activated by firms to gain advantage, either as 
a proactive act, or as a reactive act, i.e, as a response to other actors’ strategic moves in an ecosystem (cf. 
Ackoff 1974).   
Given this theoretical background, we embarked on a multiple case study with the objective of identifying 
and characterizing micro-strategies used by platform owners, as a particular strategy actor, to create and 
sustain ecosystems through platform boundary resources. 
Methodology   
Research Design 
To better understand the micro-strategizing of platform owners, we conducted a multiple, comparative 
case study (Gerring 2007; Yin 2009) of Apple’s iPhone ecosystem with a specific focus on platform 
boundary resources. A multiple case study method is powerful for conducting cross-case analysis, the 
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extension of theoretical perspectives, and is typically considered yielding more general research results 
(Benbasat et al. 1987; Eisenhardt, 1989). In addition, analytical generalization logic in a multiple case 
study is reinforced through theoretical replication logic (Yin 2009) and supports a comparative analysis 
approach. 
There is a chief reason why we embarked on a study of Apple’s platform ecosystem and four important 
APIs. Apple’s ecosystem and each of the four studied APIs represent extreme cases (Yin 2009), that is,“a 
case that is considered to be prototypical or paradigmatic of some phenomenon of interest” (Gerring 
2007, P. 101). As Gerring (2007) argue, such cases are useful for theory generation because extremes or 
ideal types typically define theoretical concepts. Since this study engages in theory-generation rather than 
theory-testing, prototypical examples of the theoretical concepts are more important than having a case 
that is representative of the overall population. .  
Data Collection 
Digital platform ecosystems is an example of an IS research topic that requires much data and a data 
collection covering multiple actors and their actions. We employed Romano et al’s (2003) methodology 
for analyzing Internet-based data on Apple’s use of boundary resources for governing their iPhone 
ecosystem, as well as the responses to Apple’s strategic moves by members of the ecosystem. As Romano 
et al. (2003) argue, secondary data, available on the Internet, provides a vast and rich data material that 
exceed well beyond what would be possible to collect through, e.g., an interview study.  
We collected secondary data covering the period between January 2007 and February 2011 from nine 
primary sources (see Table 1).. Multiple data sources are valuable for creating valid generalization forms 
and constructs through triangulation (Jick 1979), as well as for improving data quality (Creswell  2007; 
Seale 1999; Soy 1997). 
Table 1. Data Sources 
Data Sources Descriptions  
Agreements and 
guidelines 
All publically available case documents such as the Registered iPhone developer 
agreement, iPhone human interface guidelines, and SDK agreements. 
Conferences, 
events, and 
workshops 
Data collected from recorded and online-streamed Apple’s conferences and events: 
- The Apple Worldwide Developers Conference (WWDC): WWDC 2007, WWDC 
2008, WWDC 2009 and WWDC 2010. 
- Apple’s SDK events: iPhone SDK 2008, iPhone SDK 2009 and iPhone SDK 
2010. 
- Apple’s special events: Rock and Roll event 2009 and Tablet event 2010. 
- MacWorld Conference & Expo: MacWorld 2007 and MacWorld 2008. 
Corporate blog 
posts 
Data from corporate blog posts of Adobe and Skype. 
E-mail 
conversations  
22 messages between Apple and developers, Adobe and developers, Apple/Adobe 
and media, Google and media, Federal Communications Commission (FCC)/ 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and media.  
Interviews One interview with Adobe’s CEO, Shantanu Narayen: 
- 5:31 minutes video recorded interview by Bloomberg Television. 
Two interviews with Apple’s CEO, Steve Jobs 
- 6 minutes video recorded interview by ABC News. 
Transcribed interview, by Time magazine. 
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Online articles  620 articles from multiple online sources: 
- General magazines, newspapers and journals such as BusinessWeek.com, 
NYTimes.com and WSJ.com. 
- Technology-focused magazines and journals such as ComputerWorld.com, 
MacWorld.com, and TheRegister.co.uk. 
- Highly profiled Group-edited blogs about technology such as TechCrunch.com, 
GigaOM.com and Engadget.com. 
- Highly profiled tech news and analysis websites focusing on Apple news, its 
products and marketing strategies such as AppleInsider.com, iLounge.com and 
Roughlydrafted.com 
Open letters  One open letter by Apple’s CEO, Steve Jobs. 
Press releases  -       All press releases collected from Apple’s online press release library (January 
2007 – February 2011). 18 press releases were selected for further analysis. 
-    Developer news and announcements published by Apple at the iPhone Dev 
Center. 
Public government 
documents   
- Three documents from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) TO 
Apple, Google and AT&T. 
- Three response letters from Apple, Google and AT&T to the FCC. 
Data Analysis 
Using Romano et al.’s (2003) methodology, the data analysis can be described as a four-step process: 
elicitation, reduction, visualization, and comparative analysis (see Table 2). First, we used the nine data 
sources to elicit relevant data about the iPhone ecosystem and its APIs. Our initial search queries included 
keywords such as iPhone API(s), iOS API(s), Apple’s platform APIs, and combinations of these keywords. 
On the basis of this material, we conducted focused coding (Charmaz 2006) on the identified pool of 
twelve strategic APIs to distinguish four cases that (1) provide the strongest possible inferences on our 
study, (2) can help in identifying left-out variables, and (3) generalizable enough to apply to cases similar 
to those under study. The second step of our data analysis reduced the massive material collected. We 
concentrated on the four selected APIs’ cases and performed additional data collection on them with a 
focus on the key concepts of the micro-strategizing perspective. Using our conceptual basis, we identified 
major key events, key actors and key strategic moves for each of the four cases. The third step of our data 
analysis involved visualizing the four case episodes into five distinct micro-strategies. Finally, we 
conducted a comparative analysis across the cases to identify proactive and reactive elements of the 
micro-strategies across cases. 
Table 2. Data Analysis  
Steps  Tasks  Outputs 
1. Elicitation  • Elicited data from nine data 
sources. 
• Stored the data in a Qualitative 
Data Analysis (QDA) software 
system based on the day/month 
data appeared online. 
• Identifying a pool of twelve 
strategic APIs 
• Initial focused coding  
 
• Research data base 
• Numerous concepts 
related to main 
categories such iOS APIs, 
Third-party developers, 
platform ecosystem, and 
ecosystem strategizing. 
• Four main APIs were 
chosen for further 
investigation. 
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2. Reduction • Reduced the massive data 
material from the broad initial 
coding categories 
• Coded the selected data. 
• Traced the historical process 
• Applied our conceptual basis 
including platform boundary 
resources, platforms ecosystems  
and micro- strategizing to identify 
key events, key actors and key 
strategic moves.   
 
• Timeline of events. 
• Key actors. 
• Key strategic moves. 
3. Visualization  • Identified and visualized five main 
micro–strategies: 
- Case I:  2 micro-strategies. 
- Case II: 1 micro-strategy. 
- Case III: 1 micro-strategy. 
- Case IV: 1 micro-strategy. 
 
• Four case episodes. 
• Five main micro-
strategies. 
4. Comparative Analysis  • Compared the character of each 
micro-strategy across cases.    
 
• Five reactive micro-
strategies. 
• Five proactive micro-
strategies. 
Findings   
Case Setting 
Since the release of Apple’s iPhone in July 2007, its ecosystem has been growing rapidly in terms of 
developers, applications, and downloads. For instance, the ecosystem’s official distribution channel “the 
AppStore” has become the largest applications store worldwide. Given this success, it can be considered 
useful to more closely examine the strategies applied by Apple to create and sustain the ecosystem. (see 
Table 3). 
 Table 3. Apple iPhone’s Ecosystem Growth 
Ecosystem 
Growth  
2007 2008 2009 2010 Feb 2011 
Developers  0 N/A +80,000 +145,000 N/A 
Applications 0 +15,000 +120,000 +300,000 +350,000 
Downloads  0 + 0.5 Billion  +3 Billion +7 Billion  +10 Billion  
 
A central component of Apple’s strategy to grow the ecosystem is the introduction and governance of 
APIs. An API (Application Programming Interface) is particular set of rules and specifications that an API 
consumer (third-party developer) can access and make use of the services and resources offered by an API 
producer (platform owner) that implements and publishes that API (de Souza et al. 2004a; 2004b). In 
what follows, we describe the strategizing around four important APIs in the iPhone ecosystem: push 
notification, in-app purchase, voice over IP, and flash APIs. 
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Case I: Push Notification 
The Push Notification API is a functionality that enables third-party developers to maintain a persistent 
IP connection to iPhone, iPod Touch, and iPad devices. It is used to forward notifications from the servers 
of third-party developers to installed applications for notifying users about a particular event. 
Steve Jobs and the Apple team’s announcement of the iPhone’s “software roadmap”, SDK and set of APIs 
on March 6, 2008, involved little detail. Given that there already existed concerns among third-party 
developers about the (un)availability and limitations of some types of APIs, the fact that push notification 
was not introduced was a major disappointment.  
About four months later, on June 9, 2008 at Apple Worldwide Developers Conference (WWDC 2008), the 
API was finally announced. Scott Forstall, the Senior VP of iOS Software at Apple, highlighted: 
There has been one feature request that doesn’t currently exist in the SDK, that developers have 
asked for. The request is mainly coming from developers of clients like instant messaging clients, 
where by the very nature they only get notifications, even when the user isn’t currently running the 
application..…… So we absolutely want to solve this problem, the question is How?......We’ve come 
up with a far better solution, and that is, we are gonna provide a Push Notification service to all 
developer… [explaining how it works]… So the Push Notification service, it is a unified push 
notification service for all developers……this will be available in September, but starting next 
month we are gonna be seeing developers so you get your hands on it early. 
As promised, one month later, Apple launched the tools needed and distributed the ‘Push Notification’ 
API to a selected handful of third-party developers. While Apple had promised that the ‘Push notification’ 
API and associated services would be rolled out to its broader third-party developer community in 
September, 2009, the API was suddenly pulled away from the iPhone firmware with a somewhat cryptic 
explanation: “The notification code has been pulled for "further development" inside the company”. 
Third-party developers wondered if Apple intended to remove the feature completely, it was just 
overlooked, or needed additional development before a full redeployment.  
A few months later, on March, 17, 2009, Apple explained that the delay was related to a redesign of the 
server infrastructure for push notifications. Scott Forstall, the Senior VP of iOS Software at Apple, 
commented:    
You know we are late on this one. We announced this last year, and we expected to have this up in 
production by the end of the year, and we didn’t. There is a few reasons for this, ….. huge number of 
developers came to us saying how excited they were about push notification and how they are 
gonna used it in volumes that we hadn’t considered. And so we had to completely re-architect the 
server infrastructure for push notifications, and that’s what we’ve spent this last six months doing. 
Completely re-architecting it to make it really really scalable …. So now we are good to go.  
This announcement was followed by the initiation of a trial phase [May 18, 2009] where developers were 
invited to download a pre-release app and started testing the servers. The message on the iPhone 
Developer forum read: 
As a developer actively working with iPhone OS 3.0 beta, we would like your help in testing the 
Apple Push Notification service. We have selected a pre-release version of the Associated Press app 
for iPhone OS 3.0 to create a high-volume test environment for our servers. 
The ‘Push Notification’ API and associated services were entirely and officially released at Apple 
Worldwide Developers Conference (WWDC 2009) on June 8, 2009: 
We have provided a generic Push Notification service for developers …… There are three types of 
notifications you can push: text alerts like you see here, numerical badges for your home screen 
icon, and custom alerts sounds like you heard. And again this is only a few of more than a 1,000 
new APIs that make up the SDK on iPhone OS 3.0, it is an incredible SDK 
Many considered the Push Notification API well developed and extremely simple in concept including 
safety and platform-agnosticism. In addition, it was free to use by any third-party developer that had 
applications listed in the iPhone's App Store. The service and the API guard against misuse, the sender, 
the user’s device, and application were all identified and validated to secure an officially authorized 
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process. This had affected users of unlocked iPhones in that they started facing a problem in receiving 
push notifications. 
In March, 2010, Apple hired Rich Dellinger as a senior UI Designer to support the ‘Push Notification’ API 
and its associated services, One of the first initiatives Apple took under his leadership was to increase the 
security of the service. On December 22, 2010 an official email was sent to third-party developers 
informing them that service would have stronger encryption.  The email reads: 
Dear Developer, On December 22, 2010, the production Apple Push Notification service will begin 
to use a 2048-bit TLS/SSL certificate that provides a more secure connection between your 
provider server and the Apple Push Notification service. 
Case II: In-App Purchase 
The In-App Purchase API is a functionality that enables third-party developers to sell, e.g., subscriptions 
and extra content directly from their applications. The launch of the In-App purchase API coincided with 
the release of iPhone OS 3.0, including a new SDK and a set of 1,000 new APIs.  At Apple Worldwide 
Developers Conference (WWDC 2009) on June 8, 2009, Scott Forstall, the Senior VP of iOS Software at 
Apple, announced the new API:   
In-App Purchase allows developers to make financial transactions right from within the app. Now, 
this unlocks whole new categories of applications… [examples: magazine subscriptions and buying 
additional games packs]     
At the time, this was seen as perhaps the most important announcement of the new iPhone 3.0. MG 
Siegler, a well-known tech writer and analyst, stated: 
I think in-app purchases are potentially the most exciting thing about the new iPhone 3.0 SDK for 
developers. I believe it will mean a boatload of money for a great many of them as well as Apple, 
which takes its 30% cut.  
However, one of the main limitations of this API was its availability for only paid apps. Apple explicitly 
stated that they wanted free apps to be completely free. For many third-party developers, this decision 
eliminated the plans to sell expansion packs and additional contents after hooking up users with free 
applications. 
A few months later (October 15, 2009), however, Apple sent an email to third-party developers informing 
them that the In-App purchase API was changed to support free applications. The message promoted the 
API by encouraging third-party developers to use it in their apps and emphasized its use strategies:   
In App Purchase is being rapidly adopted by developers in their paid apps. Now you can use In App 
Purchase in your free apps to sell content, subscriptions, and digital services…….You can also 
simplify your development by creating a single version of your app that uses In App Purchase to 
unlock additional functionality, eliminating the need to create Lite versions of your app.  
Apple kept its policy of cutting 30% of each transaction through the In-App purchase API. The firm 
applied coherent and strict regulations on that API use. In this regard, Apple virtually determined the type 
of content, functionality, services, and subscriptions available for in-app purchase. Four different types of 
In-App Purchase were identified, complemented with a set of guidelines for third-party developers.  
The release of the In-App Purchase API for both paid and free applications was considered to have a 
massive impact on applications development and revenue streams. Apple started tightening its control of 
the AppStore. On February 1, 2011 it was reported that Apple rejected a Sony e-book reader app. Some 
application developers, including Sony said Apple told them: 
They can no longer sell content, like e-books, within their apps, or let customers have access to 
purchases they have made outside the App Store.   
Sony commented on that: 
Apple is now requiring “in-app” purchasing rather than linking out to our store. That’s not what we 
submitted based on precedent set by other eBook retailers. We’re working on a solution. 
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Apple spokesperson Trudy Muller replied to Sony’s claim: 
We have not changed our developer terms or guidelines. We are now requiring that if an app offers 
customers the ability to purchase books outside of the app, that the same option is also available to 
customers from within the app with in-app purchase. 
Apple’s new policy regarding the In-App purchase API is clearly illustrated in Apple’s developer 
guidelines, that were published on September, 2010. Section 11.2, states:      
Apps utilizing a system other than the In App Purchase API (IAP) to purchase content, 
functionality, or services in an app will be rejected. 
Following that incident, massively covered by media, Apple launched a new subscriptionservice on 
February 15, 2011. The new service was available to all publishers of content-based apps on the AppStore, 
including magazines, newspapers, video, music, etc. Steve Jobs, Apple’s CEO, clarified the basics of the 
new service in a press release: 
Our philosophy is simple—when Apple brings a new subscriber to the app, Apple earns a 30 percent 
share; when the publisher brings an existing or new subscriber to the app, the publisher keeps 100 
percent and Apple earns nothing. All we require is that, if a publisher is making a subscription offer 
outside of the app, the same (or better) offer be made inside the app, so that customers can easily 
subscribe with one-click right in the app. 
While many were debating the consequences and implications of the new API and associated services, the 
Federal Trade Commission started investigating the ramifications of the charges. This was done with 
specific focus on consumers, such as children, who may not fully realize that they are spending real money 
without parents’ permission. FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz, commented [Febrauary 22, 2011] on this 
matter: 
We fully share your concern that consumers, particularly children, are unlikely to understand the 
ramifications of these types of purchases ….. Let me assure you we will look closely at the current 
industry practice with respect to the marketing and delivery of these types of applications. 
Case III: Voice over IP 
Voice over IP (VoIP) API is a functionality that enables third-party developers to deliver voice 
communications over the Internet connections of the iPhone, iPad or iPod touch. This allows apps to 
operate over Wi-Fi and cellular 3G networks.  
The availability of the VoIP API and associated services was revealed at Apple’s iPhone SDK Event on 
March 6, 2008. The indication came from Steve Jobs, Apple’s CEO. At the press conference, he was clear 
about what would become a significant limitation::  
Press (question): will there be a VOIP app? how will partners react?                                                                      
Steve Jobs (answer): We will only limit VoIP over the cellular network, but it’ll be open over WiFi 
In view of this decision, analysts speculated that Apple was protecting their relations with mobile network 
operators, being afraid that voice apps over cellular networks would threaten their revenue streams.  
A year later [March 17, 2009] at the iPhone OS 3.0 special event, the VoIP API over Wi-Fi was exclusively 
released. Scott Forstall, the Senior VP of iOS Software at Apple, highlighted this: 
And in-game voice, if you have a game that plays over Wi-Fi, we have built in voice chat API so you 
can use to add voice into your game.  
After the exclusive and vague release of the API, third-party developers started to design and develop 
applications based on it. On March 31, 2009 Skype officially released their version of its VoIP application 
for the iPhone and the iPod touch. This put Skype in a more direct competition with mobile network 
operators such as AT&T Inc. and Verizon Wireless. Skype reported that the app was downloaded about 
one million times during the first two days after the release. Peter Parkes, Social Media Communications 
Lead at Skype, said he was:  
Confident that it’s one of the fastest-downloaded iPhone apps ever 
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However, on July 27, 2009, Apple rejected Google’s voice application started pulling all Google Voice-
enabled applications from the AppStore. A Google spokesperson, commented on that: 
Apple did not approve the Google Voice application we submitted six weeks ago to the Apple App 
Store. We will continue to work to bring our services to iPhone users — for example, by taking 
advantage of advances in mobile browsers. 
A few days later [July 31, 2009], the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) opened an inquiry 
regarding the rejection of Google Voice. They sent three separate letters to Apple, Google and AT&T. They 
mainly asked Apple about their rejection of Google’s app and other related apps, asked Google to provide 
more details about their app, and asked AT&T to clarify any engagement on Apple’s decision. In addition 
to other questions related directly to the matter. 
Apple responded to the FCC [Aug 21, 2009] by stating that they did not actually reject the app. It was still 
under review.  Apple added that AT&T was not engaged at all in the application approval process: 
Apple has not rejected the Google Voice application, and continues to study it. The application has 
not been approved because, as submitted for review, it appears to alter the iPhone’s distinctive user 
experience by replacing the iPhone’s core mobile telephone functionality……Apple is acting alone 
and has not consulted with AT&T about whether or not to approve the Google Voice application. 
Similarly, AT&T responded to the FCC [Aug 21, 2009] by stating that they did not have any role in the 
application approval process: 
AT&T had no role in any decision by Apple to not accept the Google Voice application for inclusion 
in the Apple App Store. AT&T was not asked about the matter by Apple at any time, nor did we 
offer any view one way or the other. 
The FCC also inquired about the VOIP not being supported over 3G Networks. AT&T responded that they 
will reconsider their policy and previous stance regarding VOIP over 3G networks: 
We plan to take a fresh look at possibly authorizing VoIP capabilities on the iPhone for use on 
AT&T’s 3G network. AT&T will promptly update the Commission regarding any such change in its 
policies. 
During that time, Google continued developing Google Voice for the iPhone’s web browser. The 
application was built on HTML5, a standard that Apple praised and supported. The browser-based app 
became available on January 26, 2010. As a result, Google bypassed Apple’s decisions regarding the 
Google Voice as a stand-alone app.   
Two days later [January 28, 2010] Apple opened up the 3G-based VoIP API to third-party developers, 
which enabled VoIP apps to run over the 3G Networks.  At Apple’s Tablet event [January 27, 2010, Steve 
Jobs, Apple’s CEO, announced that the restrictions on VoIP over 3G networks had been removed. In a 
statement, Apple said: 
We revised our Program License Agreement in conjunction with our updated Software 
Development Kit for iPhone, iPod Touch and iPad Apps. Included in this update is the ability for 
developers to create VoIP apps that utilize cellular networks. 
Following this key action, Apple announced at the iPhone OS 4 Event [April 8, 2010] that the VoIP API 
started supporting the multitasking and background functionalities. This meant that apps like Skype 
would be able to receive calls even if it was not in the foreground, run other apps at the same time, and 
use the double high status bar when being on a call (i.e., making the app much more like a traditional 
phone). 
For the first time, Apple [Sep 9, 2010] released AppStore guidelines for third-party developers. The 
guidelines document was intended to help third-party developers to understand the app review process 
and keeping them in line. The guidelines abstractly revealed which applications would not be allowed on 
the AppStore. Since none of the rules applied to Google Voice, it was resubmitted and Apple accepted the 
application  [Sep 27, 2010] for inclusion in the AppStore as a stand-alone application. 
General Topics 
12 Thirty Second International Conference on Information Systems, Shanghai 2011  
Case IV: Flash 
Flash API is a functionality that enables third-party developers to encode their apps and content in 
Adobe's Flash technology, and run them in the iPhone, iPad or iPod Touch devices. 
When Apple shipped its first iPhone device in June 2007, the Safari web browser was the only means for 
third-party developers to distribute and run their applications.  Since the iPhone’s debut, the Safari web 
browser has not been compatible with Flash. As a result, the growing body of third-party developers that 
ported their apps to Safari had to avoid integrating Flash in their apps.   
On March 4, 2008, Steve Jobs clarified that Flash was not suitable for the iPhone, He believed that the 
desktop version of Flash ran too slowly on the iPhone and that the mobile version of Flash was not 
functional enough. Jobs added: 
There's this missing product in the middle 
Apple released the iPhone’s software roadmap, SDK and set of APIs [March 6, 2008] without introducing 
any Flash API. Ryan Stewart, Adobe's chief spokesman for its Internet-based application, commented: 
No one aside from [Apple’s CEO] Steve Jobs has any idea if or when it's coming …. Everyone I talk 
to doesn't know anything. 
A quick response came from Adobe on March 19, 2008. Shantanu Narayen, Adobe’s CEO, pointed out 
that they were planning to develop a specific Flash tool for iPhone: 
We believe Flash is synonymous with the Internet experience, and we are committed to bringing 
Flash to the iPhone …. We have evaluated [the iPhone SDK] and we think we can develop an iPhone 
Flash player ourselves” 
In a follow-up statement [March 20, 2008]. Adobe said that Apple had to be involved to bring such 
software to the iPhone. The company said: 
To bring the full capabilities of Flash to the iPhone Web-browsing experience, we do need to work 
with Apple beyond and above what is available through the SDK and the current license around it 
With no response coming from Apple, Adobe during their Q2 [June 17, 2008] revealed a Flash for the 
iPhone running on emulation software. The company clarified: 
We have a version that’s working on the emulation. This is still on the computer and you know, we 
have to continue to move it from a test environment onto the device and continue to make it work. 
So we are pleased with the internal progress that we’ve made to date. 
A few months later [Sep 30, 2008], at the Flash On The Beach (FOTB) conference, Adobe confirmed that 
the company was working on a solution. However, it insisted that the iPhone was a closed platform, and 
that this made it uncertain whether their solution would ever be realized on the iPhone platform. In an 
interview with Bloomberg Television [Feb 2, 2009], Shantanu Narayen, Adobe’s CEO said that the 
company faced a real technical challenge: 
It’s a hard technical challenge, and that’s part of the reason Apple and Adobe are collaborating …. 
The ball is in our court. The onus is on us to deliver. 
While Adobe was struggling with finding a solution for Flash, Apple supported and praised HTML5, 
which was a web technology that could substitute Flash in web browsing. On February 24, 2009 Apple 
released Safari 4, a new version of their web browser that built around HTML5. Philip Schiller, Apple’s 
senior vice president of Worldwide Product Marketing, promoted the new Safari version: 
Safari 4 is the fastest and most efficient browser for Mac and Windows, with great integration of 
HTML 5 and CSS 3 web standards that enables the next generation of interactive web applications. 
Without Apple support, Adobe announced [October 9, 2009] the inclusion of a ‘Packager for iPhone apps’ 
in the Flash developer tool (Creative Suite 5 -CS5). While Flash applications still would not run on the 
iPhone, the CS5 simply turned Flash applications into iPhone applications automatically. 
Prior to the anticipated launch of the CS5 on April 12, 2010, Apple responded [April 8, 2010] to Adobe 
new move by releasing a new developer license agreement. In this new agreement, there was a passage 
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with major implications for third-party developers, and disastrous consequences for Adobe’s anticipated 
release of Flash CS5. Apple banned applications using intermediary layers. Section 3.3.1 in the iPhone 
SDK agreement read: 
Applications may only use Documented APIs in the manner prescribed by Apple and must not use 
or call any private APIs …. Applications that link to Documented APIs through an intermediary 
translation or compatibility layer or tool are prohibited. 
Adobe’s response was quick [April 20, 2010]. Adobe dropped future support for iPhone development in 
Flash. Mike Chambers, the Principal Product Manager for developer relations for the Flash Platform at 
Adobe, stated: 
We will still be shipping the ability to target the iPhone and iPad in Flash CS5. However, we are not 
currently planning any additional investments in that feature. 
On April 29, 2010, Steve Jobs wrote an open letter explaining why he refused to support Flash on iPhone, 
iPads and iPod devices. The letter, titled “Thoughts on Flash”, revealed six main reasons behind Apple’s 
position. Besides claiming that Flash was closed and proprietary and had major technical drawbacks 
(reliability, security and performance, battery life and touchable devices), the most important reason was: 
Letting a third party layer of software come between the platform and the developer ultimately 
results in sub-standard apps and hinders the enhancement and progress of the platform … We 
cannot be at the mercy of a third party deciding if and when they will make our enhancements 
available to our developers. 
A few days later [May 3, 2010], it was reported [New York Post] that the Department of Justice (DoJ) and 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had started negotiating over which of them would begin an antitrust 
inquiry into Apple's new policy of third-party developers required only to use Apple’s own development 
tools. Apple moved forward [September 9, 2010] and updated their policy by relaxing all restrictions on 
development tools as long as the resulting apps do not download any external code. Apple claimed that 
this move would give the third-party developers the flexibility they wanted, while Apple preserved the 
security it wanted. 
A few hours after Apple’s press release was published, Adobe decided to resume their support of Adobe’s 
Packager feature. Adobe welcomed Apple’s new policy change: 
This is great news for developers and we’re hearing from our developer community that Packager 
apps are already being approved for the App Store. We do want to point out that Apple’s restriction 
on Flash content running in the browser on iOS devices remains in place. 
Discussion  
Platform ecosystems have emerged as an increasingly powerful conception of software development 
environments characterized by multiple actors co-creating value in a coopetitive way (El Sawy et al. 2010; 
Tiwana et al. 2010; Selander et al. 2010). In this paper, we set out to provide an empirically grounded 
understanding of the micro-strategies used by platform owners in attempts to create and sustain 
ecosystems through platform boundary resources. Our focus has been on four key APIs used in growing 
Apple’s iPhone platform. In what follows, we first compare and discuss the micro-strategies 
(counteracting, resourcing, securing, monetizing, and sustaining), strategic moves, and strategy actors 
that emerged from our case analysis (see Table 4). We then outline implications, and conclude by 
presenting limitations and possible future research opportunities. 
Table 4. Micro-Strategizing across the Four Cases 
Case Micro-
Strategizing 
Strategic Moves Actors 
 
 
Proactive 
resourcing 
-Released the ‘Push Notification’ API to selected third-party 
developers. 
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-Started the testing of the API and the allocated servers. 
-Officially released the API. 
-Hired Rich Dellinger (inventor of notification system used 
in webOS at Palm) as a senior UI Designer.  
-Enhanced the API with stronger encryption method (a 
2048-bit TLS/SSL certificate) 
Proactive 
securing 
-Filed a patent application for the ‘Push Notification’ API. 
Reactive 
resourcing 
-Delayed the release of the API due to “re-architecting the 
server infrastructure” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case 
I 
Reactive 
securing 
-Pulled the API from the iPhone firmware. 
 
 
 
 
-Apple. 
-Third-party 
developers. 
Proactive  
monetizing 
 
-Released In-app purchase API for paid apps. 
-Released In-app purchase API for free apps.  
-Applied 30% transactions cut. 
 
 
 
Case     
II 
Reactive 
monetizing 
-Applied strict regulations on content, etc. 
-Tightened the control of the AppStore. 
-Launched a new ‘subscription’ service for content 
publishers. 
-Apple. 
-Sony. 
-Federal Trade 
Commission  
(FTC). 
-Third-party 
developers. 
Proactive 
sustaining 
-Released VoIP API over Wi-Fi networks. 
-Accepted and rejected applications based on 
partnership/competitor issue. 
-Published AppStore Guideline for third-party developers 
(first time ever). 
 
 
 
Case     
III 
Reactive 
sustaining 
-Released VoIP API over 3G Networks. 
-VoIP API supporting multitasking and background 
functionalities 
-Apple. 
-Google. 
-AT&T. 
-Skype. 
-Federal 
Communications 
Commission 
(FCC). 
-Third-party 
developers. 
Proactive 
Counteracting 
-Blocked Flash on Safari web browser. 
-Blocked Flash API from the SDK. 
-Changed developer license agreement and Interdicts 
Adobe’s “work-around technique”.   
-Supported HTML5 with the intention to substitute Flash on 
Safari. 
 
 
 
 
Case 
IV 
Reactive 
Counteracting 
- n/a 
-Apple 
-Adobe 
-Department of 
Justice 
-Federal Trade 
Commission 
-Third-party 
developers 
 
Comparing the four cases with the intention to characterize the nature of strategies enacted by Apple, we 
identified five different strategies that were enacted by Apple through the use of boundary resources: 
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Resourcing: Our analysis shows that resourcing is an important micro-strategy for a platform owner in 
ecosystems. We define resourcing as the provision of platform boundary resources for enriching a 
platform with new capabilities. Resourcing can either be proactive or reactive.  Proactive resourcing refers 
to the provision of platform boundary resources for enriching a platform with new capabilities. We 
observed how Apple initiated a ‘proactive resourcing’ strategy aiming to enrich the platform with new 
boundary resources.  The release of the ‘Push Notification’ API provided the platform with new 
capabilities requested by a huge number of third-party developers. In addition, the release was 
accompanied with other strategic moves. For instance, Apple improved the capabilities of the ‘Push 
Notification’ API, and  simultaneously started using a 2048-bit TLS/SSL encryption method to enhance 
the security of push notification. At the same time, we observed how Apple was resourcing the platform as 
a response to other actors’ strategic moves in the ecosystem. We refer to reactive resourcing as the 
provision of platform boundary resources for enriching a platform as a response to other actors’ strategic 
moves in an ecosystem. As an example in the push notification case, Apple delayed the release of the API 
to improve the server infrastructure to the extent to which it would handle the huge number of service-
requests by third-party developers using the API. 
Securing: Another micro-strategy that emerged from our data analysis was something that we refer to as 
securing. We refer to securing as acting on other ecosystem members’ strategic moves that would risk 
infringing the platform. Securing can be either proactive or reactive. Securing is proactive if it involves 
action on the basis of predicted strategic moves by other ecosystem actors As an example, in the push 
notification case, Apple filed a patent application to protect the intellectual property around the released 
API. Securing can also be reactive. Reactive securing means acting on realized platform-infringing 
strategic moves. As an example, pulling the push notification API entirely from the iPhone firmware for 
some time during the resourcing strategy phase was essential.   
Monetizing: Generating new business opportunities through platform boundary resources is another 
key micro-strategy. We refer to this strategy as monetizing, that is, the act of augmenting ecosystem 
relationships through platform boundary resources. Such monetizing is proactive when it involves the 
creation of a new line of business. For instance, Apple released the In-app purchase API and managed to 
build a source of income by charging 30% of the purchase each time contents were sold through an 
application in the appstore. Monetizing can also be reactive. In order to response to Sony and other third-
party developers’ strategic moves, Apple accomplished reactive monetizing by tightening control of the 
distribution channel AppStore, applying strict regulations on contents sold using the API, and launching a 
new subscription service for content publishers. 
Sustaining: We refer to sustaining as attempts to maintain existing ecosystem relationships through 
platform boundary resources. A platform owner needs to strategically sustain partnerships and deal with 
both competitors and authorities over time. Sustaining can be done both proactively and reactively. When 
done proactively, the platform owner augments ecosystem relationships through platform boundary 
resources. For instance, Apple dealt with the partnership with AT&T through proactive sustaining as they 
decided to limit the VoIP API to WiFi networks. This enabled Skype and other third-party developers to 
resource the platform, while maintaining a useful relationship with the important operator. Sustaining 
can be reactive too. In response to concerns voiced by FCC, Apple published new guidelines for their 
distribution channel ‘AppStore’ enabling them to deal strategically with competitor requests (such as 
Google’s). They also released the VoIP API over 3G networks and supported multitasking. 
Counteracting: We define counteracting as taking active measures against foreign meta-platforms and 
external boundary resources to avoid getting the platform infringed by competitors. Counteracting is 
usually proactive, although reactive counteracting also can be envisioned. As an example of proactive 
counteracting, Apple effectively hindered Adobe’s Flash boundary resources. This counteracting involved 
a series of strategic moves. Flash boundary resources were blocked on both web and mobile application 
versions. A new developer license agreement was developed to interdict Adobe’s attempts to bring Flash 
to the iPhone. In addition, Apple strongly supported HTML5 as an alternative to Flash. Lastly, although 
our analysis of the four cases did not reveal any evidence, we believe that counteracting can be reactive 
too. Consider the increasing interest in platform ecosystems in the automotive industry (see e.g., 
Henfridsson et al. 2009), where open platforms promise to offer an entire range of new functionality for 
the car driver. In this use setting, it is possible to imagine a case where authorities would demand that an 
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automaker takes measures to reduce the possibilities for outside actors to aligning additional 
communities and applications.  
Implications and Limitations of the Study 
There are a number of implications of our research. First, our perspective on micro-strategizing 
complements and extends the literature on software platforms (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 2010; 
Tiwana et al. 2010; West 2003; Yoo et al. 2010) by applying a strategy-as-process view (Chia and MacKay 
2007; Johnson et al. 2003; Jarzabkowski 2008; Whittington 2006) to platform ecosystems. Rather than 
closely analyzing platform strategy as a single and discrete strategy, the perspective proposes how a 
platform strategy emerges through the enactment of different micro-strategies as the platform owner 
discover new opportunities or react as a response to strategic moves by ecosystem members. Our multiple 
case study identified five such strategies: counteracting, monetizing, resourcing, securing, and sustaining. 
Second, our research provides a perspective on the nature of strategy in the context of platform 
ecosystems. Rather than strategically position its offer on a clearly defined market or industry (Porter 
1980), our study shows how multiple strategies need to be exercised and combined in practice to deal with 
the  ‘living’ character of ecosystems. Third, the results of our study suggest that platform owners need to 
devise repertoires of micro-strategies that can be implemented swiftly when needed. The medium for such 
micro-strategizing is boundary resources, located at the boundaries between the platform owner and 
actors in the ecosystem. Finally, we contribute to the continued investigation of digital innovation (Eaton 
et al. 2011; Henfridsson et al. 2009; Svahn et al. 2009; Yoffie 1997; Yoo et al. 2010) by illustrating how 
micro-strategizing is a useful starting-point for further study of the dynamics of platform ecosystems.  
Future studies could address several limitations in our work. First of all, it would be useful to compare our 
results with investigations of other platform owners’ attempts to strategize ecosystems through platform 
boundary resources. Apple’s iPhone ecosystem is an extreme case, which means that it is useful for 
generating new theoretical insights (Gerring 2007). However, it would be difficult to argue that it is 
representative. Consequently, studies across platform ecosystems would be valuable to increase our 
knowledge about the nature of boundary resources in ecosystem strategy. Moreover, it would be useful to 
engage in theory-testing research for creating variance theories about this topic. This could be done on the 
entire range of micro-strategies, or for each of the specific micro-strategies.  
Conclusion  
Software platforms are increasingly becoming the center of gravity of digital innovation. It is therefore not 
surprising that there is an emerging literature on platform ecosystems in our discipline. Our paper is 
intended as a contribution to this intellectual debate. As reported in the paper, we learned that platform 
owners identify, configure, enact, and practice several micro-strategies in attempts to leverage ecosystems 
through platform boundary resources. Our multiple case study identified and explored five different 
micro-strategies that can be enacted proactively or reactively: counteracting, monetizing, resourcing, 
securing, and sustaining. The sheer volume of different micro-strategies suggest that the strategy process 
in platform ecosystems is characterized by a series of different responses that jointly determine the 
relative success of a platform owner’s efforts to cultivate its ecosystem. As a result, a core competence of a 
platform owner is continuous monitoring of the ecosystem’s evolution to build the capability of timely 
responses to other actors’ strategic moves, and to proactively use boundary resources for increasing the 
viability and value-creation of the ecosystem.  
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